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TRANSFER PRICING IN BUSINESS RESTRUCTURINGS –
REASONING FROM IMPLAUSIBLE ASSUMPTIONS
ISSUE NOTE 2 - (OECD, DISCUSSION DRAFT)
Richard T. Ainsworth
&
Andrew B. Shact
The OECD’s Center for Tax Policy and Administration (CTPA) roundtable on business
restructurings in January 20051 was a considerable success. It led to a Joint Working Group
(JWG) project later that year.2 After two years the JWG project was divided so that permanent
establishment threshold issues were handled by Working Party No. 1 (a report was issued on July
17, 2008)3 and transfer pricing aspects of business restructurings were handled by Working Party
No. 6 (WP-6). The Discussion Draft on Transfer Pricing Aspects of Business Restructurings
(the Discussion Draft)4 is the first product from WP-6 on this matter. It was available for public
comment between September 19, 2008 and February 19, 2009,5 and it attracted over 500 pages
of commentary from 36 sources.6
FOCUS ON ABUSIVE TRANSACTIONS
If the WP-6 work-product follows through to a conclusion it will (of necessity) be
broadly applicable to all cross-border restructurings (under Articles 5, 7 and 9 of the Model Tax
Convention) and not just to a small subset of tax abusive restructurings. The Discussion Draft
states that it is not concerned with domestic anti-abuse rules, even though the selective (onesided) application of anti-abuse rules may be the true source of business concerns in this area.7
1

OECD, Second Annual Center for Tax Policy and Administration Roundtable: Business Restructurings
(Roundtable, summary) available at:
http://www.oecd.org/document/20/0,3343,en_2649_37989760_34535252_1_1_1_1,00.html
2
OECD, Approval of the Mandate, available at:
http://www.oecd.org/document/11/0,3343,en_2649_37989760_38087051_1_1_1_1,00.html
3
OECD, Report on the Attribution of Profits to Permanent Establishments July 17, 2008) available at:
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/20/36/41031455.pdf
4
OECD, Transfer Pricing Aspects of Business Restructurings: Discussion Draft for Public Comment – 19
September 2008 to 19 February 2009 (Sept. 19, 2008) available at:
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/59/40/41346644.pdf (hereinafter Discussion Draft).
5
Available at: http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/59/40/41346644.pdf
6
OECD, Public Comments on the Transfer Pricing Aspects of Business Restructurings, available at:
http://www.oecd.org/document/25/0,3343,en_2649_37989760_42155737_1_1_1_1,00.html
7
Article 1 of the OECD Model states that the benefits of a tax treaty should not be available to a taxpayer where the
main purpose for entering into a transaction is to secure a more favorable tax treatment. Issue Note No. 4 of the
Discussion Draft come the closest to explaining how business restructurings and anti-abuse rules relate. See
Anuschka J. Bakker & Giammarco Cottani, Fourth Issue Note: Sting in the Tail, INTERNATIONAL TRANSFER
PRICING JOURNAL 81 (March/April 2009). Few jurisdictions conduct audits, and make adjustments based on a
business restructuring that placed more (not less) income within local entities. However, if the other jurisdiction
seeks to prevent this income loss through the application of anti-abuse rules (rather than transfer pricing rules), then
there may not be an effective mechanism to secure corresponding adjustments. Placing the entire cross-border
(business restructuring) fact pattern within the ambit of the transfer pricing provisions of the Model Tax Convention
(where there are clear mechanisms for achieving parity) makes a lot of sense. Discussion Draft, supra note 4, at ¶¶
8, 18.4, 195, & 196.
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That being said, when considered broadly, the Discussion Draft appears to narrowly
focus on just such abusive restructurings. For example, illustrations in the Discussion Draft only
examine profit allocations (there are no loss patterns considered). In addition, the Discussion
Draft selects its illustrations from a limited number of transaction-types that are commonly
associated with abusive restructurings: (a) the conversion of a fully-fledged manufacturer to a
contract manufacturer (or toll manufacturer), (b) the conversion of a fully-fledged distributor to a
stripped distributor (commission agent, commissionaire, or classic buy-sell distributor) with
some additional (but limited) illustrations drawn from (c) the development of shared service
centers and contract service providers, as well as (d) the transfer of intangible assets to off-shore
holding companies. This paper will rely on additional illustrations drawn from well known
business restructurings to try to bring out the full impact of the Discussion Draft.
THE ESSENCE OF THE TRANSFER PRICING PROBLEM
The core transfer pricing problem in a MNE’s business restructuring is the fact that: (a)
the decision to reorganize is made centrally but (b) the arm’s length principle mandates that the
transfer of functions, assets and/ or risks among related parties must be accounted for locally (at
the entity level).
This is the case even though entity-to-entity transfers may not be the way anyone
understood these transactions in the restructuring plan. In many cases hypothetical arm’s length
prices for transfers need to be derived only for tax purposes. Finding these prices can be a
difficult if not an impossible task when intangible assets or substantial business risks are
involved.
However, to make matters worse, the Discussion Draft adds to the natural difficulties of
these tasks by suggesting that not only are assets, rights, and risks transferred in a restructuring,
but there is something else of value, something it identifies as “profit/loss potential” (which is
not itself an asset) that is “carried” between entities in a restructuring. This too must be valued
(when it is found) and considered in the calculus of the arm’s length price.
SOLUTION BY ASSUMPTION
(AND PROBLEMS WITH THIS APPROACH)
The Discussion Draft resolves many of its most difficult problems with assumptions.
These assumptions frequently have an intuitive appeal, but are not buttressed empirically,
marketplace studies.
This paper considers one of these assumptions. In Issue Note No. 2 (Arm’s Length
Compensation for the Restructuring Itself) a central contention is that not only do businesses that
restructure have a clear grasp of (and take an accurate measure of) the synergistic value of the
restructuring they are engage in, but they also can and do measure alternate courses of action. In
other words, specific transfers occur (WP-9 assumes) because these are the best result that could
be achieved from among a number of known (or knowable) options. Thus, taxpayers and tax
authorities (theoretically) can measure the values being transferred indirectly – by examining the
“other options reasonably available.”8
8

Discussion Draft, supra note 4, at ¶ 209 indicates:
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But, how good are we at anticipating and then measuring the synergies that are expected
to be derived from a restructuring? What if the empirical evidence suggests that most business
restructurings have “… no effect – and some actually destroy value?” What if, “… fewer than
one-third [of all business restructurings] produce any meaningful improvement in performance?”
What if, “… there is a profound misunderstanding about the link between [business] structure
and [fiscal] performance?”9 What if (to take a specific case) a thoroughgoing two-year business
restructuring that appeared to everyone to be the poster child of a restructuring success story
(Wall Street’s profit expectations were exceeded by 50%), in fact turns out to be nothing short of
restructuring “suicide?”10
If this is the case, then how do we value entity-level transfers within a MNE
restructuring? And then, how do we add to this value the anticipated profit/value that is carried
with the transferred assets? Should be draw any comfort when the solution to valuation
problems is to value instead the “other options reasonably available” to the entities engaged in
the transfer.
THE DECISION-MATRIX INTANGIBLE
Is it possible that even with our best efforts we really do not know (until some time has
passed) what values were created (or destroyed) in a restructuring? What if the source of our
problem is that successful restructurings are in fact all about creating a new decision-making
intangible? What if a successful restructuring is far more that just shuffling assets around that
are embedded with potential profits or losses? This is what the empirical evidence suggests.
And if this is the case, how do we accurately measure this intangible without using hindsight?
Such an intangible is exceptionally unique – it is the business plan on how to best make
decisions that optimize performance. It is a tailor made intangible that fits a specific enterprise.
It is an intangible that is difficult to duplicate in any but the most general ways. However, it is
an intangible that has huge (potentially enterprise-saving) value if the CEO “gets it right.”

The application of the arm’s length principle is based on the notion that independent enterprises,
when evaluating the terms of a potential transaction, will compare the transaction to the other
options realistically available to them, and they will only enter into the transaction if they see no
alternative that is clearly more attractive. … The OECD is of the view that at arm’s length, an
independent party would not enter into a restructuring transaction that is expected to be clearly
detrimental to it if it has the option realistically available to it not to do so. In evaluating whether
a party would at arm’s length have had other options realistically available to it that were clearly
more attractive, due regard should be given to all the relevant conditions of the restructuring, to
the rights and other assets of the parties, to any compensation or indemnification for the
restructuring itself and to the remuneration for the post-restructuring arrangements … as well as
to the commercial circumstances arising from participation in an MNE group … .
9
Marcia W. Blenko, Michael C. Mankins & Paul Rogers, The Decision-Driven Organization, HARVARD BUSINESS
REVIEW 56 (June 2010). See also: Marcia W. Blenko, Michael C. Mankins & Paul Rogers, DECIDE AND DELIVER –
5 STEPS TO BREAKTHROUGH PERFORMANCE IN YOUR ORGANIZATION (Oct. 2010) (empirical support for the
positions taken in the June article are set out in the forthcoming book which the author has received in an “advance
reader’s copy” compliments of the publisher).
10
This is the story of BP. Tony Hayward’s 2007 reorganization of BP had been deemed a success by 2009 (even by
Blenko, Mankins & Rogers in both article and text). However, by 2010 the reorganization is considered “suicidal”
by Jeffrey Stamps & Jessica Lipnack as a significant cause of the Deepwater Horizon disaster, see infra note 28.
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For cross-border tax purposes then, how should the ambiguity in valuing this new
intangible inform our analysis? Should a portion of the value of this intangible be imputed to the
functions, assets and/or risks that are transferred in the restructuring? Should (or can) a clear
distinction be drawn between the potential profit/loss value of the decision-making intangible
and the potential profit/loss value that is inherent in the transferred assets themselves?
Does the Discussion Draft get this analysis right? Or, does it simply assume too much
and end up being a very unstable text when applied in a real restructuring setting? Does the
absence of even a single example dealing with restructuring losses belie a belief by WP-6 that
restructurings almost always improve fiscal performance, or that its real concern is with tax
abusive restructurings?
Three real world examples will be helpful. The first example, Ford Motor Company,
highlights the transfer of intangible assets; the second example, BP, highlights the connection
between risk and decision-making; the third example, Xerox, highlights how CEOs frequently
“get it all wrong” before the right decision-matrix is found to bring out the synergies in the
enterprise. Ford and Xerox seem to be successful reorganizations; BP appears to be a failure.
After these examples the second Issue Notes of the Discussion Draft is examined
(section-by-section) in light of the questions posed above. The paper concludes that the
Discussion Draft needs to be developed further if the intent is to present a full consideration of
transfer pricing in the context of all cross-border business restructurings.
BUSINESS RESTRUCTURING AT FORD (2006) –
Transferring Intangibles and a Successful Business Restructuring
. By 2006 the Ford Motor Company had been losing market share by a point or more
each year since 2000. Alan Mulally, Ford’s new CEO11 began a successful reorganization of the
company in 2006. He called it “the way forward” or “Ford fights back,”12 and Ford returned to
profitability in 2010.
Structurally, Mulally moved Ford from a regional-business-unit design to a global matrix
of complementary functionalities. Characteristic of the new Ford was an increase in the use of
global car platforms, and global parts suppliers.13 The Ford Motor Company of Canada (a
wholly owned subsidiary of the Ford Motor Company) was directly affected. Ford Canada was
required to close its Windsor Castings subsidiary.14 Windsor Castings was a “green” company.
It was one of Canada’s largest recyclers. At the time of its closing Windsor was producing
11

Prior to 2006 Alan Mulally was the CEO of Boeing’s Commercial Airplanes division.
Mark Fields, Executive Vice President and President of the Americas, Ford Fights Back, (Ford Press Release)
January 23, 2006 available at: http://media.ford.com/article_display.cfm?article_id=22464
13
Ford Press Release, Sustainability Report 2009/10: New Global C-Car Platform Illustrates ONE Ford Plan in
Action, available at: http://www.ford.com/microsites/sustainability-report-2009-10/economy-case-platform. Joseph
White, One Ford for the Whole World, WSJ (March 17, 2009) at D2, available at:
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123724332577548061.html
14
Ford’s decision was to out-source casting operations. Ford generally moved away from in-house casting.
Production was also terminated at the Ford casting facility in Cleveland Ohio. See: Production Ends at Historic
Windsor Casting Plant, WEBWIRE (May 29, 2009) available at:
http://www.webwire.com/ViewPressRel.asp?aId=37549
12
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engine blocks and crankshafts for seven Ford models entirely out of reprocessed steel. This
function however, was being outsourced to low cost manufacturers.
Among car enthusiasts Windsor Castings has a different reputation. Rather than being
noted as a “green” company, Windsor Castings is noted as the birth place of the exceptionally
durable Windsor small-block V-8 engine (first introduced in 1962).15 Although slated for
replacement several times, the Windsor design refused to die. It was simply that good. It
outlasted all competitors. Today, Ford’s racing engines are essentially upgrades of the
Windsor.16 Windsor Castings however, was not as fortunate as its engine – the plant was closed;
but the engine lives on.17 The simple transfer pricing question in this pattern is: Who owns the
Windsor engine design intangibles today, and what should they have paid for them?
Because the arm’s length principle applies to reorganizations at the entity level, when the
Windsor engine intangibles18 are transferred to a related-party Windsor Castings must be
compensated in a manner comparable to how an independent entity would be compensated
(operating at arm’s length) under similar circumstances. These valuable intangibles do not just
transfer for free, simply because they are going to a related party in the same MNE. The
Discussion Draft makes it clear that if this is a cross-border transfer, then Article 9 of the Model
Tax Convention applies.
This story presents a simple transfer pricing question because the text narrows the focus
to a single intangible asset in an entity that is being terminated. This problem would be far more
complex if the focus was Ford more broadly, and if Windsor Castings continued to operate, but
under the influence of a new decision matrix. In that case the value of the intangible, its inherent
profit/loss potential, and the anticipated impact of the new organizational structure would all
need to be measured.
BUSINESS RESTRUCTURING AT BP (2007)
Transferring Risk and a Failed Business Restructuring
When Tony Hayward became CEO of BP in 2007, the company produced 3.8 million
barrels per day. ExxonMobile produced slightly more – 4.2 million. The stock market however,
“valued” each BP barrel at $59 while a barrel of ExxonMobile was worth $122.19 Why was
there such a difference?
15

The first Windsor engines (the 221 series) was used in the early Ford Fairlane. The second series (the 260’s) was
used in the Ford Falcon, the Mercury Comet, and the 1964 Mustang. A special rally version was used in the AC
Cobra sports cars. The Shelby GT-350 used the 289. The Windsor lineage extends to the Racing Boss 351 engine
that currently sells for $1,999 at Ford Racing Performance Parts.
16
Jeff Huneycutt, Ford 351Engine Block The Boss Late Model: Circle Track tests Ford’s new Boss351 Block and
N351 in Complete Late Model Stock Build, CIRCLE TRACK (April 2010) available at:
http://www.circletrack.com/enginetech/ctrp_1004_ford_351_engine_block/index.html
17
Ford Motor Company, Annual Report 2007 at 13, available at: http://www.ford.com/doc/2007_ar.pdf
18
These facts are abbreviated. The Windsor engine was not exclusively produced at Windsor Castings, although it
was conceived (first design and production) at the Ontario plant. Design modifications to the Windsor engine were
made at other Ford facilities. However, the Windsor engine had its genesis at Windsor Castings, and was still being
produced there the day it was closed. The Ford plant in Cleveland Ohio was also involved in production of the
Windsor engine.
19
James Harding, Chief Putting the Petroleum back into BP, The Sunday Times 49 (Oct. 12, 2007) available at:
http://business.timesonline.co.uk/tol/business/columnists/article2641410.ece
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Hayward believed BP’s organizational structure negatively impacted margins. He set out
to correct this through a business restructuring. Hayward told shareholders, “Our problem is not
about the strategy but about our execution of it … our organization has grown too complex …
what [we will be] doing represent[s] a fundamental shift in how BP works.”20 Lord John
Browne, his predecessor, had also restructured when he became CEO in 1996 and this is what
Hayward was going to change.
The BP that Lord Browne inherited had five business units21 each of which, “… operated
with a high degree of independence and intra-group trading [was] carried out strictly on arm’s
length terms.”22 Browne’s restructuring extended the logic of this model by further subdividing
“… BP into 150 business units and giv[ing] each manager considerable freedom. The only
conditions [imposed on the managers] were that they respect certain “boundaries” – essentially
the core values of the company – and deliver on their performance contracts. … Browne
downsized or completely eliminated much of the staff-supported, vertical, command-and-control
infrastructure, abolishing the offices of country presidents and several functional departments in
London.”23 Browne believed that fully autonomous subunits and empowered managers
unleashed entrepreneurial spirits, promoted innovation and made the company more profitable.
Browne also recognized that keeping managers accountable according to their performance
contracts encouraged cost-cutting. Integration under Browne was horizontal not vertical.24
From a transfer pricing perspective Lord Browne’s BP (and the BP before him) is exactly
what a tax administration wants to see – a MNE that actually deals with related parties at arm’s
length. Corporate policy and tax policy coincide. The problem is – a MNE operating this way
does not (according to the next CEO, Tony Hayward) optimize shareholder value.25
Hayward attributed BP’s poor margins to the complexity of the horizontal integration in
Lord Browne’s system. Hayward therefore, structurally consolidated the 150 units and
20

BP Press Release, BP Sets Out its Agenda to Close Performance gap with Rivals, (Oct. 11, 2007) available at:

http://www.bp.com/genericarticle.do?categoryId=2012968&contentId=7037438.
21

The five units were: exploration and production; refining and marketing; chemicals; minerals; and nutrition
Monopolies and Mergers Commission, The Government of Kuwait and The British Petroleum Company plc – A
Report of the Merger Situation, Chapter 4, at ¶ 4.11 (Oct. 1988) available at: http://www.competitioncommission.org.uk/rep_pub/reports/1988/fulltext/231c04.pdf
23
Sumantra Ghoshal & Lynda Gratton, Integrating the Enterprise 44 MIT SLOAN MANAGEMENT REVIEW 37 (Fall
2002) (emphasis added).
24
Lord Browne was a strong advocate of horizontal integration of MNEs (as opposed to the traditional, vertical
command and control model). Using a strong technological infrastructure, and developing intellectual, social, and
emotional integration, peer groups coalesce (and reinforce each other) horizontally. See: Deborah Ancona & Henrik
Bresman, Crafting and Infrastructure for Innovation – The X-Team Program, in X-TEAMS: HOW TO BUILD TEAMS
THAT LEAD, INNOVATE AND SUCCEED, Chapter 8 (2008); Howard Gardner, Changing Minds, STRATEGY &
INNOVATION – BREAKTHROUGH INSIGHT AND IDEAS FOR DRIVING GROWTH 3 (Harvard Business School Publishing
Newsletter) May/June 2004; Steven E. Prokesch, Unleashing the Power of Learning: An Interview with British
Petroleum’s John Browne, Harvard Business Review 5 (Sept./Oct. 1997).
25
Hayward’s belief is of course very consistent with an economic understanding of the nature of a MNE. Long
established economic theory suggests that the only reason for a MNE to exist is to produce goods or services more
efficiently than the marketplace. Thus, if all intercompany transactions are conducted exactly as they would be in
the market, then MNEs would not be needed and would be replaced by the market. Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of
the Firm, 4 Economica 386 (1937)
22
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eliminated overlapping functions. Hayward did not, however, pull back the decisional
independence of the units – and this may have been a mistake.26 Hayward’s BP tended toward
vertically integration, but decisions were still made largely by trusted professional staff within
each business unit (as they were under Browne).
BP’s 2008 Annual Report states: “From 1 January 2008, BP has two business segments:
[1] Exploration and Production and [2] Refining and Marketing.”27 Eleven levels of
management were reduced to seven,28 and “[b]y late 2009, BP had eliminated $3 billion in costs
and was turning a profit that beat analysts’ expectations by 50%.”29
Was Hayward’s restructuring a success? Early balloting said “yes.” After Deepwater
Horizon30 the answer is “no.” Deepwater exposed an aspect of Hayward’s restructuring that was
not well considered – in extremely high risk situations the decision-makers were separated from
ultimate liability-holders. In other words, managers in the business units were uniformly
encouraged to make short-term cost-cutting decisions, but under Hayward they were freed from
the cautions of long-term risk assessments (something that had previously come through
Browne’s horizontal coordination structure).31
For this reason Stamps and Lipnack consider Hayward’s reorganization “suicidal.” They

contend that the Deepwater disaster is “... a massive organizational failure, not [a failure] of
people but of [organizational] design.”32 Hayward’s testimony before Congress made this clear.
When he explained to Congress that his own reorganization kept him out of the Deepwater

26

The reason that this may have been a mistake is that Hayward’s consolidation removed the (complex) horizontal
integration that Browne relied upon, but did not replace it with a comparably effective vertical integration.
27
BP 2007 Annual Report 16.
28
Jeffrey Stamps & Jessica Lipnack, Why BP Crashed and Killed the Gulf, HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW BLOG (The
Conversation) June 23, 2010 available at:
http://blogs.hbr.org/cs/2010/06/why_bp_crashed_and_killed_the.html#comment-58478880.
29
Marcia W. Blenko, Michael C. Mankins & Paul Rogers, The Decision-Driven Organization, HARVARD BUSINESS
REVIEW 61 (June 2010)
30
The Deepwater Horizon oil spill is a massive (and at the time of the writing an ongoing) spill in the Gulf of
Mexico that is considered to be the largest offshore oil spill in US history – some estimates place it as the largest oil
spill in the world. The spill stems from the Macondo wellhead on the ocean floor that began gushing oil after the
Deepwater Horizon drilling rig exploded. Experts fear that the spill is an environmental disaster. On June 20, 2010
BP agreed to set up a $20 billion spill fund, and pledged US assets worth $20 billion as bond.
31
Liability for the oil spill is with BP plc, not with decision-making subsidiaries. The well is operated by BP
Exploration and Production Inc. (BP-E&P) a wholly-owned US subsidiary of another US company, BP America
Inc. (BP-A). BP-A is a wholly-owned subsidiary of the UK parent company, BP plc. Profits from the well were to
be split along ownership lines: 65% to BP plc; 25% to Anadarko; 10% to MOEX Offshore 2007 (a wholly owned
subsidiary of Japan’s Mitsui Oil Exploration Ltd.) According to Anadarko, documents were filed with the US
government indicating that the same parties agreed to split liabilities in the same proportion (barring “gross
negligence or willful misconduct” by one of the parties). Andarko’s position is it is not liable for any part of the
spill, because BP plc was grossly negligent – most likely because BP plc had designated BP-E&P to be the decisionmaker on the rig, knew that BP-E&P was programmed to make cost-minimizing decisions, and did not exercise
control over those activities when risk of liabilities were extremely high. From the days of Lord Browne, BP-E&P
operated under a short term (cost-saving) decision structure. There is no indication that this operating posture
changed under Hayward.
32
Stamps & Lipnack, supra note 28.
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Horizon decision-loop the front page of the Wall Street Journal carried his picture with this
caption: “I’m not stonewalling. I simply was not involved in the decision making process.”33
The transfer pricing question presented by the Deepwater Horizon oil spill concerns the
attribution of risk. The proper allocation is to attribute the Deepwater Horizon risk to Tony
Hayward’s new decision-making matrix. This intangible was created by the restructuring and is
located at the corporate headquarters (BP plc in London). The BP fact pattern is not properly
analyzed by only looking at the asset transactions between BP plc and BP-E&P.
From a contract and financial capacity standpoint, the risk of the Macondo Well should
rest with BP plc. However, because day-to-day decisions at the Macondo Well are made by BPE&P without critical oversight by BP plc there is some ambiguity in the fact pattern. Neither BP
plc nor BP-E&P carried insurance for blowout losses.34
A static analysis would ask (in 2007) whether or not risks associated with the Macondo
Well resided with BP-E&P (under Lord Browne), and whether it was transferred to BP plc
(under Tony Hayward). If so, BP plc would expect to be compensated by BP-E&P for assuming
this risk. A more dynamic analysis however, would consider the restructuring itself as an
intangible-creating activity. BP plc possesses Tony Harward’s new decision-matrix for
managing BP. Thus, the management risk associated with the Macondo Well resides in London.
Hindsight makes it clear this is where the risk and loss is. BP plc (not BP-E&P) is setting
up a $20 billion fund for damaged wildlife, businesses and shorelines. BP plc is expecting to
recognize $10 billion in losses on its UK returns (not BP-E&P on its US returns).35 However,
this is not an assessment that would be easily reached, nor is it a risk that would be easily
measured with foresight in 2007.
BUSINESS RESTRUCTURING AT XEROX (2001) –
Multiple Restructurings before Success
The 2001 restructuring of Xerox, led by CEO Anne Mulcahy, was a success.36 Success
was not over-night. It was seven years later before the press reported that Xerox profits had
“skyrocketed 79%.”37
33

Michael M. Phillips & Stephen Power, BP Chief on Hot Seat, WSJ 1 (June 18, 2010). See also: Marty
Beckerman, Context-free Highlights from Tony Hayward’s Testimony ESQUIRE (June 17, 2010), available at:
http://www.esquire.com/blogs/politics/tony-hayward-quotes-061710
I wasn't part of the decision-making process... I wasn't involved in any of the decision making... I
simply was not involved in the decision-making process... I was not part of that decision-making
process... I was not involved in that decision... I was not involved in the decision making... That
was a decision I was not party to.... I wasn't involved in the decision making on the day... I wasn't
involved or aware of any of the decisions... I wasn't involved; I'm sorry.
34
David S. Hilzenrath & Kimberly Kindly, Gulf of Mexico Oil Spill: Who’s accountable? THE SEATTLE TIMES (June
25, 2010) available at: http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/nationworld/2012201745_oil25.html
35
Ed Crooks, Spill Cost to Cut BP Tax Bill by $10bn, FINANCIAL TIMES 1 (July 13, 2010).
36
Success may have been visible as early as 2004:
Note that revenues have not grown, but the company has returned to solid, if not spectacular
profitability, debt is down 45%, and cash balances are very healthy. Xerox stock has rebounded
from its low of $4.20 on October 20, 2002, to $15.00 as of April 1, 2005. Finally, the product
development program is showing results as forty new products have been introduced.
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Until the Federal Trade Commission (in 1975) forced Xerox to license its technology to
competitors it enjoyed a near monopoly position in the plain-paper copier market.38 It had the
success and the financial strength to develop an obsession with quality. It was the first company
ever to win the triple crown of quality: the Deming prize in Japan in 1980; the Baldridge award
in the US in 1989; the European Foundation for Quality award in Europe in 1992.39
Xerox was unprepared for price competition, and as it lost market share its’ CEOs began
restructuring. David Kearns restructured the company twice in the 1980’s, his successor Paul
Allaire40 arrived in 1992 and restructured four more times.41 Richard Thoman was brought in
from IBM in 1999,42 and true to form, Thoman began a seventh (failed) restructuring.43
Thoman was quickly replaced by Anne Mulcahy in 2001. None of the seven
restructuring efforts before her had been successful. Xerox was close to bankruptcy,44 and under
an SEC investigation that would culminate in a $170 million charge. Share prices were in
freefall ($65 share prices in 1999, fell to $27 when Mulcahy took over as COO, and fell further
to a low of $4.44 by the time she was CEO). Mulcahy began the eighth restructuring. This time
it worked.
Mulcahy’s restructuring was “decision-driven” not structure-driven. She began with an
examination of every critical decision Xerox needed to make and execute to fend off bankruptcy.
Decisions were carefully assessed, clearly articulated, and efficiently executed. She raised
cash,45 preserved R&D and enhanced customer relationships by moving risk and authority to
make sales-critical decisions down the supply chain – closer to the customer.
Bill George, Anne Mulcahy: Leading Xerox through the Perfect Storm (A) and (B) 10 (Teaching Note) (HBS No. 5408-101) (Feb. 21, 2008).
37
Ruthie Ackerman, Xerox’s Nifty Turnaround, Forbes.com (Jan. 24, 2008) available at:
http://www.forbes.com/2008/01/24/xerox-office-closer-markets-equity-cx-ra-0124markets30.html
38
Bill George, Anne Mulcahy: Leading Xerox through the Perfect Storm (A) 2 (HBS No. 5-405-050) (Jan. 26, 2005)
(indicating that by 1970 Xerox held a 90% share of the market with gross margins on key products ranging from
70% to 80%).
39
David E. Hussey, STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT – FROM THEORY TO IMPLEMENTATION, 671 (1988).
40
Bill George, Anne Mulcahy: Leading Xerox through the Perfect Storm (A) and (B) (Teaching Note) (HBS No. 5408-101) (Feb. 21, 2008) (indicating that Paul Allaire’s tenure was “marked by continuous reorganization”).
41
Allaire created three geographically defined sales areas that sold products from nine divisions organized around
market segments. Each division had end-to-end responsibility for a set of products and related services. Each
division had its own manufacturing, income statements and balance sheets. In subsequent restructurings the nine
divisions ar reduced to four, but company-wide management was reintroduced. Bill George, Anne Mulcahy:
Leading Xerox through the Perfect Storm (A) 2-3 (HBS No. 5-405-050) (Jan. 26, 2005)
42
Paul Thoman was the CFO of IBM prior to coming to Xerox, and had designed the IBM restructuring in the
personal computer division. As an outsider he was seen as a change agent, but remained in position for 13 months
before he was replaced by Anne Mulcahy.
43
Thoman endeavored to duplicate the IBM restructuring, changing Xerox to a service business in the process.
Thoman centralized. Three customer billing centers replaced 30 geographically oriented centers. Two-thousand
geographically based sales team members were reassigned to sell tailor-made Xerox solutions to industry groups.
44
Harvard Business School teaches the Xerox restructuring in conjunction with bankruptcy strategy. Bill George &
Andrew N. McLean, A Strategic Perspective on Bankruptcy (Technical Note) (HBS No. 406-080) (Jan. 30, 2006).
45
Xerox’ China operation was sold for $550 million, half of its 50% stake in Fuji Xerox was sold to Fuji Film for
$1.28 billion. Half of the office-copier manufacturing operations were sold to Flextronics for $229 million. The
financing business was sold to GE Capital. The low end “Single Office/ Home Office” was closed down.

9

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1645404

Richard T. Ainsworth & Andrew Shact
Business Reorganization
Monday, July 19, 2010

… Xerox moved from a global customer structure, in which sales and pricing
decisions were made by global teams organized around industry verticals, to a
simpler country structure, where those decisions rested with local sales teams.
The new structure enabled Xerox to eliminate several layers of middle
management, increase local accountability, and take nearly $1 billion out of the
company’s cost structure in just two years. The simpler structure also
concentrated decisions related to the shift from analog to digital technology –
critical to Xerox’s success in office products at the time – within the senior
leadership of the Product organization, which helped accelerate the pace of new
product introductions in this vital segment. The explicit focus on where decisions
should be made was critical to the successful turnaround at Xerox.46
In executing the turnaround much of Mulcahy’s success derived from her direct
engagement with employees and customers. Structural adjustments were one thing (and they
were substantial47) but the restructuring only worked because Mulcahy did not spend her time
with the numbers at headquarters – she was out building and reinforcing the Xerox intangible.
She demonstrated decisiveness and customer commitment.
Mulchahy recognized that the only way to rebuild the value of the Xerox
franchise was by trying to save or restore customer relationships, rebuild
employee morale, and inspire creative people.48
Mulchahy was known for cancelling shareholder meetings, but made it clear that she would fly
anywhere to save a valued customer relationship.49
THE DISCUSSION DRAFT
Overview
All business restructurings have two phases: (a) the restructuring itself and (b) the postrestructuring business operations. Transfer pricing issues arise in both phases. The Discussion
Draft focuses mostly on the first.
In this initial phase two critical transfer pricing events occur. First, a new decisionmatrix (the set of decision about how decisions are made) is established. Secondly, a series of
related party transfers are carried out. Functions, assets and risks are transferred (all in
accordance with the restructuring plan) to facilitate efficient management by the decisionmakers.
The Discussion Draft does not acknowledge the first of these events. More importantly,
the Discussion Draft does not recognize that this event constitutes the creation of a valuable,
unique intangible. The implementation of a new enterprise level decision-matrix is no different
than any other corporate R&D effort, except in this instance the effort is directed inward at the
corporate decision structure instead of outward at a new consumer product or commercial design.
46

Marcia W. Blenko, Michael C. Mankins & Paul Rogers, The Decision-Driven Organization, HARVARD BUSINESS
REVIEW 59 (June 2010).
47
She reduced Xerox’s 96,000 employees by 30,000, and restated profitability from 1997 – 2001 by $1.9 billion.
48
Bill George, Anne Mulcahy: Leading Xerox through the Perfect Storm (A) and (B) 12 (Teaching Note) (HBS No.
5-408-101) (Feb. 21, 2008).
49
Bill George, Anne Mulcahy: Leading Xerox through the Perfect Storm (A) 9 (HBS No. 5-405-050) (Jan. 26, 2005)
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Establishing a present value for the new decision-matrix intangible is an entirely
speculative endeavor at the initial phase of a restructuring. At this point everything is potential.
The new system could work spectacularly, or it could fail miserably. Xerox is a notable example
of this. Nothing is known about the actual values that will be returned to the enterprise until well
into the post-restructuring phase. The only way that returns (profit or loss) attributed to this
intangible becomes a transfer pricing concern is when they get mixed up with the inherent
profit/loss potentials that are embedded in various assets, right or risks that are being transferred.
The Discussion Draft misanalyses this point. Using the expression “profit/loss potential”
broadly, the Discussion Draft associates all improvements in enterprise performance with
structural changes. It allows no room for decision-based improvements. The Discussion Draft
considers all “profit/loss potential” to be fully derivative of asset transfers. It theorizes that preexisting rights, functions or assets “carry” these “potentials” from one related party to another in
the restructuring. The way the Discussion Draft sees things,
The question is whether there are rights or other assets transferred that carry
profit/loss potential, and should [there] be remuneration at arm’s length.50
The difficulty with the Discussion Draft’s approach is that its assertions do not square
with the research. Fiscal performance (profit/loss) is far more closely associated with the way
business decisions are made than it is with the way a MNE is structured. Blenko, Mankins and
Rogers indicate:
Our research and experience confirm the tight link between [fiscal] performance
and [enterprise] decisions. In 2008, we … surveyed executives worldwide from
760 companies, most with revenues exceeding $1 billion, to understand how
effective those companies were at making and executing decisions. … We found
that decision effectiveness correlated at a 95% confidence level or higher for
every country, industry, and company size in our sample. Indeed, the companies
in our sample that were the most effective in decision making and execution
generated average total shareholder returns nearly six percentage points higher
than those of other firms. … What’s more, the research revealed no strong
statistical relationship between structure and performance.51

ISSUE NOTE No. 2
ARM’S LENGTH COMPENSATION FOR THE RESTRUCTURING ITSELF
Introduction
At seventy-six paragraphs Issue Note No. 2 is the largest of the four Issue Notes in the
Discussion Draft. It sets out the analysis for determining the arm’s length price for transfers that
occur as part of a business restructuring. From the opening sentences of the introduction this
Issue Note ignores the fact that successful business restructurings are far more about establishing
effective decision structures than they are about moving assets around within the multinational
enterprise itself. It states:
50

Discussion Draft, supra note 4, at ¶ 18.2. The workability of this approach seems to be doubt even by the OECD.
WP-6 specifically invites comments from the public on this point. Discussion Draft, supra note 4, at ¶ 66.
51
Marcia W. Blenko, Michael C. Mankins & Paul Rogers, The Decision-Driven Organization, HARVARD BUSINESS
REVIEW 57 (June 2010)

11

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1645404

Richard T. Ainsworth & Andrew Shact
Business Reorganization
Monday, July 19, 2010

Business restructurings involve transfers of functions, assets and / or risks with
associated profit / loss potential between associated enterprises, for instance from
a restructured operation to a foreign related principal. Restructurings can also
involve the termination (including non-renewal) or substantial renegotiation of
existing arrangements (whether or not formalized in writing), e.g. manufacturing
arrangements, distribution arrangements, licenses, service agreements, etc.52
The Discussion Draft is very clear that amounts for “associated profit / loss potential”
need to be added to (or subtracted from) the value of functions, assets or risks transferred among
related parties to arrive at the arm’s length price. There is only limited analysis of losses
(subtractions), even though failure is just as likely as success in a business restructuring.53 Issue
Note No. 2 is broken down into four sections with (B) being the most important:
(A) Understanding the restructuring itself.
(B) Reallocation of profit/ loss potential as a result of a business restructuring.
(C) Transfer of something of value (e.g. an asset or an ongoing concern).
(D) Indemnification of the restructured entity for the detriments suffered as a
consequence of the restructuring.
(A) Understanding the restructuring itself
Restructurings are the norm, not the exception for MNEs. In fact, “… nearly half of all
CEOs launch a reorg[anization] during their first two years on the job …”54 As a result the
Discussion Draft has far reaching implications for MNE tax compliance. Section (A) is on
understanding the restructuring and considers three sub-topics: (A.1) identification of related
party transactions; (A.2) reasons for restructuring and the synergistic benefits; and (A.3)
assessment of entity-level options available.
(A.1) Identification of Related Party Transactions
The first step is to identify related party transactions within the restructuring. A
functional analysis is needed and a search for comparables is required. The Discussion Draft
recognizes that transfers of tangible assets are easier to identify than are transfers of rights and
risks. A before-and-after functional analysis is required:
This [functional] analysis must include an identification of the functions before
and after the restructuring, and an evaluation of the rights and obligations of the
restructured entity under the pre-restructuring arrangement (including those
existing under contract and commercial law) and of the manner and extent to
which those rights and obligations change as a result of the restructuring.55

52

Discussion Draft, supra note 4, at ¶ 46 (emphasis added).
The omission of losses from the Discussion Draft is a common occurrence. In Issue Note No. 2 that are only
substantively considered at ¶¶ 95-97. In other Issue Notes the situation is much worse. See: Baker & McKenzie,
Comments on the OECD Restructuring Discussion Draft10 (discussing Issue Note No. 1 Baker & McKenzie
observe that: “… No mention is made of allocation of losses related to the risk. One would think that parity is
important.”) Available at: http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/53/36/42203499.pdf
54
Marcia W. Blenko, Michael C. Mankins & Paul Rogers, The Decision-Driven Organization, HARVARD BUSINESS
REVIEW 56 (June 2010).
55
Discussion Draft, supra note 4, at ¶ 50 (emphasis added).
53
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Comparables are needed. The Discussion Draft is not put off by evidentiary difficulties.
When evidence is lacking the Discussion Draft authorizes the use of hypothetical comparables:
In the absence of evidence of rights and obligations in a comparable situation, it
may be necessary to determine what rights and obligations would have been put
in place had the parties transacted with each other at arm’s length.56
(A.2) Reasons for Restructuring and the Synergistic Benefits
Business representatives at the 2005 CTPA Roundtable explained and the Discussion
Draft reiterates a standard list of reasons for restructuring.57 Blenko, Mankins and Rogers do the
same, but draw it all together in a simple conclusion – restructurings are undertaken to improve
financial performance. They state:
Some [CEOs] preside over repeated restructurings. The immediate motives vary.
Some are about cutting costs; others are about promoting growth. Some are about
shaking up a culture; others are about shifting strategic focus. Whatever the
specifics, though, reorg[anization]s almost always involve making major
structural changes in pursuit of better [financial] performance.58
“Better [financial] performance” is a synonym for what the Discussion Draft calls
“synergistic gains.” Documentation for “anticipate synergy gains” (or documentation of
anticipated financial improvement) is required by the Discussion Draft. In a very interesting
section the Draft explains that this documentation can most likely be found in support of “nontax” changes to the “decision-making process” of the enterprise.
This is a type of documentation that is likely to be produced for non-tax
purposes, to support the decision-making process of the restructuring. For
transfer pricing reasons, it would also be reasonable to expect such documentation
to provide an analysis of the effects of the restructuring on each affiliate or
taxpayer (costs and anticipated benefits) as well as an assessment of the other
options realistically available to it.59
This is where the Discussion Draft begins to go astray. The decision-making process is
not peripheral to the restructuring; it is central to it. It is not just the place to find data and
analysis about assets being transferred; it is the place to find data about the unique intangible
(the new decision-matrix) that is being created through the restructuring. This intangible is the
reason for the entity-level transfers.
Changes to the decision-making process are the heart of any successful business
restructuring. Decision-making changes empirically correlate with performance improvements.
Blenko, Mankins and Rogers indicate that: “[D]ecision effectiveness and financial results
correlate at a 95% confidence level or higher for every country, industry, and company size in
our sample [of 760 companies].60
56

Discussion Draft, supra note 4, at ¶ 52 (emphasis added).
Discussion Draft, supra note 4, at ¶ 52.
58
Marcia W. Blenko, Michael C. Mankins & Paul Rogers, The Decision-Driven Organization, HARVARD BUSINESS
REVIEW 56 (June 2010) (emphasis added).
59
Discussion Draft, supra note 4, at ¶ 53 (emphasis added).
60
Supra note 51
57
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The Discussion Draft completes this subsection with a number of standard observations:
(a) “…anticipated synergy gains do not necessarily mean that the profits of the MNE group will
effectively increase after the restructuring …”61 (b) “…synergy gains do not always materialize
…”62 and (c) “…group-wide synergies … [can be offset by] … local synergies … [or visaversa]”63
(A.3) Assessment of Entity-level Options Available
This section underscores that the arm’s length principle applies at the entity level, not the
group level.64 Comparable transaction need to be identified to determine an arm’s length price.
If it turns out that comparable transactions are difficult to find (externally), then it is assumed
that the arm’s length price can be indirectly inferred. It is slightly greater than the next-best
option realistically available.65 In other words, the Discussion Draft presumes the availability
of internal comparables (theoretically available and analyzed as part of the process of setting the
transfer price). The Discussion Draft does recognize that it is always possible that there may not
be such next-best options.66
The Discussion Draft relies on an unrealistic assumption. A MNE’s restructuring is
conducted at the group-level. It attempts to produce group-level synergy gains. It is simply not
realistic to expect that restructuring documentation contains contemporaneous analytics of entitylevel options that would produce entity-level synergy gains. Why would a CEO seeking to
change the decision-matrix for the MNE be concerned with entity-level alternate courses of
action? Nevertheless, the Draft states:
… it would also be reasonable to expect such [enterprise-level] documentation to
provide an analysis of the effects of the restructuring on each affiliate or taxpayer
(costs and anticipated benefits) as well as an assessment of the other options
realistically available to [the affiliate].67
This is not very satisfying. It is however, a very common approach in the Discussion
Draft – Assumptions offer answers to many critical questions.
A concrete example is helpful. Tony Hayward restructured BP in 2007 when he replaced
Lord Browne as CEO. Lord Browne had also restructured BP when he became CEO in 1996.
Most observers expect that soon after the Macondo Well is capped Tony Hayward will be
replaced with a new CEO,68 and this person is likely to restructure BP yet again. This
restructuring will feature a new decision-matrix. The objective will be to make BP more
sensitive to risks at the highest levels of the company. BP will invariably forecast that this
restructuring will cure lagging performance.
61

Discussion Draft, supra note 4, at ¶ 54.
Discussion Draft, supra note 4, at ¶ 55.
63
Discussion Draft, supra note 4, at ¶ 57.
64
Discussion Draft, supra note 4, at ¶ 58.
65
Discussion Draft, supra note 4, at ¶ 59.
66
Discussion Draft, supra note 4, at ¶ 60.
67
Supra note 59; Discussion Draft, supra note 4, at ¶ 53.
68
Edward Luce, Anna Fifield, Sheila McNulty & Kate Burgess, Anatomy of a Disaster, FINANCIAL TIMES 2 (July 3,
2010) (indicating that the most likely candidates are Robert Dudley, BP’s Managing Director for the Americas and
Asia, or Iain Conn, Chief Executive, Refining and Marketing).
62
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To support the new decision-matrix there will be transfers of functions, assets, risks or
rights among BP plc, BP-E&P and other related entities. At a minimum the new decision-matrix
and asset transfers will guarantee that the CEO is no longer out of the loop on high risk drilling
decisions. To accomplish this, risks will be transferred from BP-E&P and other subsidiaries to
BP plc. Under the Decision Draft BP plc will need to be compensated at arm’s length for
assuming additional risks.
The Discussion Draft unrealistically assumes that documentation supporting entity-level
asset transfers will provide an “… assessment of the other options realistically available to …”
BP plc, BP-E&P and other entities. In other words, the Discussion Draft assumes that there will
be a “what if” exposition on what BP-E&P would likely receive from ExxonMobile if it were to
transfer risks, assets, or functions to ExxonMobile instead of BP plc. This would seem to be a
bit far from the mark of what the new BP CEO would be looking at.
(B) Reallocation of profit/loss potential as a result of a business restructuring
Section (B) of Issue Note No. 2 is the smallest of the four sections, but it is easily the
most important. It is however, is critically deficient. Section (B) confuses an association
(transferred assets are accompanied by a reallocation of profit/loss potential),69 with causality
(reallocations of profit/loss potential follows from an asset transfer).70
These concepts are not the same. The transfer price for an asset should not be affected by
changes in expected profits or losses if those changes are not caused by the asset transfer. If (at
an entity-level) profits or losses are expected to change because of a restructuring, it does not
necessarily follow that the assets transferred are the cause of these changes. Thus, it does not
follow that the full scope of entity-level profit/loss changes should be reflected in the arm’s
length price for a transferred asset.
Stated another way, it is entirely possible that entity-level profit or loss may change after
a business restructuring, but the cause of the change is not an inherent attribute of the transferred
asset – even though the profit/loss change is strongly associated with the transfer.
This paper argues that (a) because a successful business restructuring is largely the result
of a newly created intangible asset – the new decision-matrix of the MNE – and (b) because this
intangible plays the most significant role in overall profit/loss of the MNE after the restructuring,
and thus in the reallocation of profit/loss potential among the entities within the MNE, then (c)
the arm’s length price for the transfer of functions, assets, and/or risks in a restructuring should
not include the full value of the profit/loss potential associated with the transfer. The arm’s
length price should only reflect the profit/loss potential that is causally related to the asset that is
transferred.

69

“… transfers of functions, assets and / or risks in the context of a business reorganization are typically
accompanied by a reallocation of the profit/loss potential among members of a MNE group…” Discussion Draft,
supra note 4, at ¶ 62 (emphasis added).
70
“Transfer pricing consequences of a reallocation of profit/loss potential that follows from a reallocation of risks,
rights and / or other assets.” Discussion Draft, supra note 4, at ¶ 63 (heading) (emphasis added).
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For example, assume entity (X) has a $100 million certificate of deposit returning 10%
annually for five years, and this asset is transferred to related party (Y) pursuant to a business
restructuring. Assume further that this asset is transferred after year 2, and the interest rate is
exceptionally favorable. There is an inherent profit/loss potential embedded in the asset, and
(X) should receive compensation for the asset and this potential at arm’s length. The
marketplace solves the transfer pricing problem by using the present value of the stream of
income that the asset will accrue in years three through five.
However, what if the CEO determines (as part of the restructuring) that (Y) will use the
$100 million to invest in a high risk/high return start-up venture? What if this venture is
expected to return 35% per year over the next 3 years (but could also return losses of 15% over
the same period)? Profit/loss potential of (Y) has changed. The change is associated with the
asset transfer, but it is not caused by the transfer. The cause of the change is the CEO’s decision
in the context of the MNE restructuring effort.71
Thus, entity-level profit/loss potential can change in a business restructuring. All changes
in profit/loss potential are associated with asset, risk, or rights transfers. Some changes in
profit/loss potential are inherent in the transferred asset; other profit/loss potentials are derived
from other aspects of the restructuring decision. Section (B) makes no effort to distinguish
among these two distinct sources of change in profit/loss potential.
There are two subsections to Section (B): (B.1) Transfer pricing consequences of a
reallocation of profit/loss potential that follows from a reallocation of risks, rights and/or other
assets; and (B.2) Compensation as a result of a business restructuring.
71

This example is simple. It can be re-drawn with facts that are closer to a real world restructuring, as follows.
What if instead of transferring a certificate of deposit the restructuring transfers a business function? In this case,
suppose the MNE is currently structured functionally (vertical function stovepipes): R&D is performed in a single
entity; manufacturing is performed in one or more dedicated manufacturing subsidiaries; all sales personnel are
grouped into one or more sales entities; follow-up services are in another group of subsidiaries. Suppose the CEO
decides to restructure the MNE into global divisions, so that each division (dedicated to a specific aggregate of
products defined by an identified customer base) assumes complete “end-to-end” business capability – business
planning, product planning, development, manufacturing, distribution, market, sales, and customer service and
support. Each division would be so autonomous that it could produce discrete income statements and balance
sheets.
In this restructuring consider just the transfer of a single manufacturing function for a specific product.
Assume the manufacturing facility (X) currently has nine product lines [1 to 9], and it transfers one of them [1] to
(Y). How should (X) be compensated at arm’s length? There is certainly a profit/loss potential inherent in the [1]
manufacturing function. This amount could be determined based on comparable manufacturers of products similar
to [1], or by applying a recognized transfer pricing method [cost plus, or transactional net margin].
However, if the CEO is right, and this restructuring is a success, then the entire MNE could be turned
around. The CEO recognized additional potentiality for profit/loss based on synergies coming from the new “endto-end” division structure. This value must be attributed to the restructuring decision of the CEO. It is a return to
the decision-matrix intangible created by the restructuring. It is not a value inherent in the [1] manufacturing
process even though this value is associated with the transfer of the [1] manufacturing process.
These are essentially the facts of the 1992 restructuring of Xerox by CEO Paul Allaire [the nine business
divisions were: Personal document products; Office document systems; Office document products; X-soft;
Advanced office documentation services; Document production systems; Printing systems; Xerox engineering
systems; and Xerox business services] . It was ultimately unsuccessful. David E. Hussey, Strategic management –
From Theory to Implementation, Xerox: Transforming the Corporation, Chapter 35, 680, 685 (1988); Bill George,
Anne Mulcahy: Leading Xerox through the Perfect Storm (A) 2-3 (HBS No. 5-405-050) (Jan. 26, 2005)
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(B.1) Transfer Pricing Consequences of a Reallocation of Profit/ Loss Potential that
Follows from a Reallocation of Risks, Rights and / or Other Assets
There are three brief paragraphs in this critical section of the Note. Although the heading
leads one to believe that this section is about causality (“… potential that follows from a
reallocation…”) there is nothing here about causation.72
The first paragraph makes the straight-forward argument that there are instances where
risks, rights and/or other assets are transferred and this transfer leads to changes in profit/loss
potential that in turn may need to be considered when determining arm’s length compensation.73
The second paragraph is definitional and makes two points: (a) that profit/loss potential is not an
asset itself; it is just a “potential” which is “carried” by rights or assets, and (b) that profit/loss
potential is more than just the profit/loss value of an indefinite continuation of the status quo.
The term is more open-ended, more expansive – but its limits are not defined.74
The third paragraph skips over causation and moves directly to valuation. It indicates
that valuing profit/loss potential can stand as a surrogate for directly valuing the transferred risks,
rights, or assets. In transfer pricing terminology paragraph three provides a valuation
methodology.75 The paragraph indicates that proper account needs to be taken of (1) potential
losses as well as potential gains; (2) options that would be available to independent parties, and
(3) subsequent (post restructuring) activities of both parties.76
(B.2) Compensation as a Result of a Business Restructuring
The second section begins with a restatement of the causation statement from (B.1), “…
where there is a transfer of profit/loss potential that follows from a business restructuring …”77
and then asks how do we know if the compensation received by the transferor is at arm’s length?
Five brief paragraphs follow.
The Discussion Draft first lists three factors to be considered: options realistically
available; expected returns to the transferor and transferee; compensation for transferred profit
potential. The Draft then provides two descriptive examples and three cases. Each example and
each case is highly simplified.
The first example involves the conversion of a full-fledged manufacturer to a contract
manufacturer; the second considers the conversion of a full-fledged distributor to a low-risk
distributor. The three cases extend the distributor example with numbers

72

This omission leads the reader to believe that the Discussion Draft either: (a) equates association with causation,
or (b) assumes that a simple association with profit/loss potential is sufficient to include that value in the indirect
measure of the transferred assets.
73
Discussion Draft, supra note 4, at ¶ 63.
74
Discussion Draft, supra note 4, at ¶ 64.
75
Direct valuation method would be: comparable uncontrolled price method, the cost-plus method, the resale price
method, or perhaps a transactional net margin method.
76
Discussion Draft, supra note 4, at ¶ 65.
77
Discussion Draft, supra note 4, at ¶ 66.
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Aside from the fact that each case study seems to reach the wrong conclusion as
written,78 each case is also simplified in a way that assumes away the most difficult issues. The
cases use a metric of “net profit margin / sales” to assess change. However, in the words of the
cases: how do we know that the change in the “net profit margin / sales” ratio is caused by the
transferred assets, and not simply associated with the restructuring? Did the decision matrix
change (as normally occurs in a business restructuring)?
What if the restructuring in these cases involved changes in the chain of command?
What if each entity is made part of an “end-to-end” business division dedicated to a single
product? This was what Paul Allaire did in his restructuring of Xerox in 1992. How much of the
change in the “net profit margin / sales” ratio is attributable to this new decision-matrix, and how
much is attributable simply to the transfer of assets?
The 1992 Xerox restructuring was a noted failure, however all the contemporaneous
expectations for the restructuring were outstanding. What VP of tax would not agree with his
new CEO that the turnaround was going to be a great success? The Discussion Draft would (as a
result) find that there was significant “potential profit” embedded in the transfers.
The problem is, things got much worse at Xerox. In fact, the company’s slide continued
year-by-year until 2001. The Discussion Draft is silent on whether or not adjustments to the
1992 transfer prices would be allowed when it became apparent that the projected gains turned
out to be bankruptcy-threatening losses. It took eight reorganizations before Xerox “got it right.”
Similarly, consider the 1996 restructuring of BP by Lord Brown. Even though Browne’s
design was (eventually) found to weigh too heavily on BP’s profitability, there were noted
predictions of success early on as BP split into 150 autonomous business units.
In BP’s case success was attributed in equal measure to local autonomy and to Browne’s
vision for intelligent integration through IT-linked peer groups. Business analysts were
uniformly in agreement that profitability was attributable to changes in the way decisions were
made – the horizontal integration factor.
For example, when Polly Flinn – then a young manager from Amoco with no
experience working outside the United States – became the managing director of
BP’s retail business in Poland, she drew on active help from the marketing peer
78

Baker & McKenzie Global Transfer Pricing Steering Committee, Comments on the OECD Restructuring
Discussion Draft 15. For example, on the first case Baker & McKenzie indicates:
In case No. 1, the example is misconstrued. The discussion of the example in section 70 invites the
question of a compensation for conversion of the full risk distribution. This is just the opposite of
the appropriate tax treatment. The average profit margin on historical data is 2 %. The midpoint of
future profit expectations is also 2 %. The guaranteed, stable profit post conversion is also 2 %.
Given some risk aversion, the general economic principle correctly invoked in section 66 calls for
a lower margin than 2 % as a guaranteed, stable profit, say for 1 %. This is because a higher
expected return goes along with higher risk so that a lower risk premium in a stable profit situation
implies a lower return. Opposite to what is alleged in section 70, in case No. 1 an independent
party would be asked to pay for the conversion rather than being paid one (if at all there should be
a payment).
Available at: http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/53/36/42203499.pdf
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group and turned her business from a $20 million-per-year loss to a $6 million
profit within 18 months.
The combination of empowerment and support improved business
performance, producing two main results. First, top-level managers developed
growing confidence in the strategy of delegating authority to the business-unit
leaders. Second, the company had more resources to invest in developing the
integration infrastructure, including IT systems, and in building conversation and
communication mechanisms.
Those investments further strengthened the
mechanisms and the processes of horizontal integration.79
(C) Transfer of something of value (e.g. an asset or an ongoing concern)
This section provides a detailed consideration of a range of business restructuring
transfers. One would expect that this section would be a great help to taxpayers seeking to apply
the principles developed earlier (in Section B). One would expect that the new concept of
profit/loss potential would be high on the list of clarified ideas. The range of transfers
considered in Section C is broad – tangible assets, intangible assets, a going concern, and
outsourcing.
However, the transfer of profit/loss potential is only considered in the context of a going
concern (not with tangible or intangible assets, and not in an outsourcing context). In Section C
profit/loss potential is expressly equated with “good will.” There is confusion and significant
critical commentary because of the way Section C seems to re-characterize transfers of
profit/loss potential.
To step back a bit, Section B presented the core question of Issue Note No. 2: “The
question is whether there are rights or other assets transferred that carry profit / loss potential and
should [they] be remunerated at arm’s length?”80 Thus, if Section C (the application section)
only considers profit/loss potential when a going concern is transferred, then does Section C
mean that profit/loss potential is only carried when there is this kind of aggregate transfers? In
other words, is it only when an integrated set of rights, assets, risks and activities are transferred
in a going concern that we need to be concerned about the transfer of profit/loss potential?
The Discussion Draft organizes Section C into four parts: (C.1) Tangible assets; (C.2)
Intangible assets; (C.3) Transfer of activity (ongoing concern); and (C.4) Outsourcing.
(C.1) Tangible assets
Tangible asset transfers are not presented as problematical in most cases.81 Minor
problems can arise. Problem cases arise more from the transfer of a tangible being overlooked,
than being difficult to measure.
79

Sumantra Ghoshal & Lynda Gratton, Integrating the Enterprise 44 MIT SLOAN MANAGEMENT REVIEW 37 (Fall
2002). See also: Steven E. Prokesch, Unleashing the Power of Learning: An Interview with British Petroleum’s
John Browne, Harvard Business Review 5 (Sept./Oct. 1997); Howard Gardner, Changing Minds, STRATEGY &
INNOVATION – BREAKTHROUGH INSIGHT AND IDEAS FOR DRIVING GROWTH 3 (Harvard Business School Publishing
Newsletter) May/June 2004.
80
Discussion Draft, supra note 4, at ¶ 18.2; see also ¶¶ 64, 66, & 92.
81
Discussion Draft, supra note 4, at ¶ 72 (indicating, “…it is generally considered that transfers of tangible assets do
not raise any significant transfer pricing difficulty, …”)
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An inventory example is developed. A full-fledged manufacturer is transformed into a
toll manufacturer, and an off shore related party acquires the finished inventory as well as stores
of manufacturing supplies. CUP, resale price and cost-plus methods are proposed to measure the
value of the transferred property.82
(C.2) Intangible assets
Intangible asset transfers present a more difficult scenario, but once again the Discussion
Draft applies standard transfer pricing analysis. Determining if an arm’s length price has been
paid requires an assessment of the entire commercial arrangement between the parties.83
If assets are transferred when values are entirely speculative the Discussion Draft
assumes that a price adjustment mechanism would normally be found in the contract.84 Only
when discussing the transfer of contracts rights [a long-term contract to provide certain goods to
customers] does the Draft mention “profit potential.” But this is not profit/loss potential. It is
simply profit potential, and the idea at this point is that there will be a known profit component
embedded in the long term contract being transferred. The transfer price needs to consider this
factor.85
This is not a difficult transfer pricing problem. A known profit element is very different
from the much more ambiguous added value derived from a potential for profit or loss as
discussed in section B.
This is very much like the case of the Windsor small V-8 engine design intangibles.
When these intangibles were transferred from Ford Canada’s subsidiary (Windsor Castings) to a
related party, it was not difficult to determine the value of the intangible. The engine casting
function was being outsourced to third parties, and as a result there were reliable internal
comparable for the Windsor V-8 engine.
(C.3) Transfer of activity (ongoing concern)
There are two parts to (C.3). In the first part the Discussion Draft considers the transfer
of ongoing concerns (the transfer of an activity), and it immediately links this discussion with the
major concern from section (B), the transfer of profit /loss potential. The third sentence of the
opening paragraph literally equates profit/loss potential with the goodwill component in an
ongoing concern.86 The second section of (C.3) is also unique. It is one of the few places in the
Discussion Draft where loss transfers are specifically considered.87
In the first part, the Discussion Draft asserts that when a business restructuring includes
the transfer of a going concern that (a) goodwill is commonly transferred along with the assets,
82

Discussion Draft, supra note 4, at ¶ 76.
Discussion Draft, supra note 4, at ¶¶ 85-86.
84
Discussion Draft, supra note 4, at ¶ 88.
85
Discussion Draft, supra note 4, at ¶ 92.
86
Discussion Draft, supra note 4, at ¶ 93 (“In effect, transfers of going concerns between independent parties often
takes account of any possible “good will,” i.e., of the profit/loss potential (if any) of the activity transferred, from the
perspective of both the transferor and the transferee.”)
87
See the limited consideration of losses at Discussion Draft, supra note 4, at ¶ 65.
83
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function, rights and risks as part of the going concern, and (b) that this goodwill represents
profit/loss potential. Thus, when an arm’s length price is paid for a going concern it will
necessarily include a payment for goodwill and this in turn is the measure of profit/loss potential.
This line of reasoning is problematical for almost all the commentators. Baker and
McKenzie’s Treaty Policy Working Group provides a capable summary of the criticism:
… good will does not equal profit potential, and both are distinct from going
concern value. Good will is the value arising from the expectation that customers
will return to the usual place. Going concern value is the residual value of a
business after all the other assets have been identified and valued. These assets
typically do not transfer in a business restructuring. The going concern value of a
collection of business assets located in a country does not move to a different
entity if those assets and persons will now be deployed in the same place in a new
set of activities. Similarly, good will (as distinct from assets such as trademarks)
also normally would not be separated from the functions and assets that remain in
place. The value of an intangible normally would not carry with it the value of
goodwill that is associated with other business assets that are not transferred.
Indeed, goodwill generated through the past activities of a business can disappear
in a business restructuring or asset sale, …88
The USCIB has similar concerns but phrases them in terms of Discussion Draft
paragraphs headings. USCIB asks very specifically: is the profit/loss potential that is carried by
transferred assets (as was the case in Section B) a distinct concept, or is it just a component of
goodwill only found in the transfer of an ongoing concern (as in Section C) or can it be found in
both? USCIB’s commentary on the Discussion Draft states:
Query, is profit potential an asset similar to, or a component of, the good
will of a going concern as in ¶93, or is it associated with a transferred asset as in
¶64? This is an important question, as it relates directly to the question of what
has been transferred and what needs to be included in the value of the transferred
function.
Good will is typically viewed as a residual value …
88

Baker & McKenzie, Treaty Policy Working Group Letter to Jeffrey Owens - Transfer Pricing Aspects of Business
Restructurings 21 (March 5, 2010) available at: http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/12/16/42301918.pdf. See also
Confederation Fiscale Europeenne, Opinion Statement of the CFE Fiscal Committee on the OECD Discussion Draft
on Transfer Pricing Aspects of Business Restructuring 3 (February 18, 2010) available at:
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/37/15/42327182.pdf; Ernst & Young, Transfer Pricing Aspects of Business
Restructurings - Comments on the OECD Discussion Draft 11 (February 16, 2010) available at:
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/21/43/42189108.pdf; IDW, Discussion Draft on the Transfer Pricing Aspects of
Business Restructurings 4 (February 26, 2010) available at: http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/0/1/42274053.pdf;
KPMG, OECD Invitation to Comment on the OECD’s Discussion Draft regarding Transfer Pricing Aspects of
Business Restructuring 17-18 (February 18, 2009) available at: http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/18/30/42242520.pdf;
Mayer, Brown International LLP, Comment on the OECD’s Transfer Pricing Aspects of Business Restructurings 5-6
(February 19, 2009) available at: http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/18/29/42242541.pdf; Siemens, Comments on
Transfer Pricing Aspects of Business Restructurings, February 18, 2009 available at:
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/1/20/42268159.pdf; Lari Hintsanen & Jukka Karjalainen, Consultation on OECD
Discussion Draft on Transfer Pricing Aspects of Business Restructurings ¶ 3.1 (February 18, 2009) available at:
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/2/32/42266342.pdf; Deloitte, Consultation on OECD Discussion Draft on Transfer
Pricing Aspects of Business Restructurings 8 (February 18, 2009) available at:
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/18/18/42241697.pdf.
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Going concern is often viewed as the value created by assembling and
organizing the myriad of small assets and incremental relationships that are
required to start and maintain a business. …
The key question for the authors of the Draft Report is whether the
transfer of an intangible asset at arm’s length will be respected as including the
profit potential of exploiting the subject intangible (¶64) or whether the profit
potential will be classified as a goodwill intangible subject to separate valuation
(¶93).89
It is simply not possible to resolve the questions that are raised by the way the Discussion
Draft merges the concept of profit/loss potential from Section (B) with the applications in
Section (C). Something is amiss. Far too many commentators are having difficulty with exactly
the same points.
In the second part of (C.3) the Discussion Draft looks at loss transfers. This is one of the
few places where loss transfers are considered. The analysis however is limited to loss transfers
associated with the transfer of an ongoing concern. By negative inference then, this analysis
suggests that loss transfers either (a) do not arise when tangible or intangible assets are
transferred, or (b) if they do occur then normal transfer pricing practices are sufficient to
determine the arm’s length price.
As expected, no distinction is drawn between losses that are attributable to decisionbased aspects of the restructuring, and losses that are inherent elements of the transferred
activity. Because both can be present in any transfer this ambiguity furthers confusion.
For example, assume a loss-making function is performed in a particular entity, but the
function is deemed necessary by the MNE as a whole and must be retained. Perhaps the MNE
has a reputation as the “go to” place for top quality, historically accurate hardware for doors and
windows. Unfortunately, some historically important pintels for exterior window shutters need
to be forged by hand. These pintels never return a profit, but it is not entirely clear if the losses
are due to the hand forging procedure, or to the business structure.
Assume further that the company is structured according to customer type – homeowners,
small independent contractors, major builders – and each business unit provides end-to-end
service by customer category.90 Suppose the CEO proposes to move to a product-type structure.
In doing so he will: (a) aggregate all pintel fabrication from all business units and place them in
one entity, and (b) locate this entity in Eastern Europe where there is an excellent reservoir of
hand craft metal forging talent.
There are a lot of questions here that boil down to: (a) should the Eastern European entity
be paying, or receiving compensation for the transfer of the pintel fabrication activity, and (b)
how much is that arm’s length payment? More specifically we will need to know, how much of
the loss (in a specific pintel fabrication function under the old structure) is attributable to the
89

USCIB, Comments on Discussion Draft on Transfer Pricing Aspects of Business Restructurings,6 (February 19,
2009) available at: http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/2/1/42267799.pdf.
90
This is the Xerox structure after the 1992 restructuring.
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inherent unprofitability of pintel fabrication, and how much of it is attributable to the “defective”
end-to-end business structure? The Eastern European entity should not be concerned with losses
generated by the old structure.
Will the new structure be a success? If so, is there an off-setting, decision-based profit
potential in the new structure that Eastern Europe needs to factor into the arm’s length price?
Success cannot be assumed – failures in restructurings run at about a 70% level. Thus, the norm
is for double losses to show up in this fact pattern: (a) one loss that is inherent in the activities
transferred, and (b) another loss that is caused by the restructuring itself.
Suppose this restructuring follows the normal course: (1) before the restructuring the
CEO is fully convinced that this effort will be a great success story, but (2) the outcome is that
the restructuring has a negative impact on financial performance.91 Without using hindsight,
how should the related parties value the transfer of pintel fabrication to Eastern Europe? Should
the CEO’s expectation of a successful restructuring be factored into the value, or should only the
inherent non-profitability of pintel fabrication be considered?
If only the inherent non-profitability of pintel fabrication is considered, how do we peel
away the value (the profit/loss potential) that stems from the decision to “correct” the old
structure? Will documentation be available to support this kind of value-discrimination? Given
the fact that the CEO has made an enterprise-wide decision to engage in this restructuring, what
are the chances that most of the available, contemporaneous documentation will point to a
positive outcome? If the synergies derived from moving pintel fabrication to Eastern Europe are
overstated, can they be subsequently adjusted?
The Discussion Draft provides no solutions.
The thrust of the Discussion Draft is to point to a range of possible outcomes based on
what an independent party operating at arm’s length would do. The Discussion Draft indicates
that compensation could go either way (depending on the facts) and the valuation should be
determined by analysis of comparables. This is all well and good, but what we really need is
some direction on how to parse out the determinants of value in a restructuring, and the
Discussion Draft gives us none.
(C.4) Outsourcing
The last (one paragraph) section of part (C) simply observes that, “[i]n outsourcing cases
… [one related] party [may] voluntarily decide to undergo a restructuring and bear the associated
restructuring costs in exchange for anticipated cost savings.” A hypothetical is presented where
a manufacturing entity outsources its manufacturing function to a related party in a low cost
jurisdiction. There is no discussion of profit/loss potential transferring with the outsourcing.
(C.4) concludes that outsourcing is a common practice in the marketplace among independent
parties:
Independent parties at arm’s length do implement this type of outsourcing
arrangement and do not necessarily require explicit compensation from the
91

Marcia W. Blenko, Michael C. Mankins & Paul Rogers, The Decision-Driven Organization, HARVARD BUSINESS
REVIEW 56 (June 2010).
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transferee if the anticipated cost savings for the transferor are greater than its
restructuring costs.92
A number of real world examples can be marshaled in support of the Discussion Draft’s
observation. For example, outsourcing is the life-blood of Flextronics International Ltd. This
Singapore-based company has roughly 78,000 employees in 29 countries on five continents. It is
the outsourcing company of choice for products as wide ranging as Microsoft’s Xbox and Lego
building blocks. Flextronics is a frequent business school case study on manufacturing
efficiency.93
Thus, in 2003 when the Lego Group faced a deficit of DKK 1.4 billion, followed in 2004
by an even larger deficit, and in 2005 by a deficit of DKK 1,931 million, they restructured and
looked to Flextronics for an outsourcing solution. In 2006 the world’s fourth largest toy
manufacturer laid off most of its employees (employment went from 8,300 to 3,000) and
transferred most of its production to Flextronics.94 Flextronics paid nothing for the transfer of
the ongoing concern. Lego then purchased inventory from Flextronics’ Mexican facility and
resold to the public. Profitability returned to Lego Group the next year.
Xerox faced similar difficulties. Beginning in about 1992 Xerox’s downward slide
continued until it posted its first ever net loss in 1999, followed by even worse numbers in 2000.
Mulcahy’s 2001 restructuring came amid bankruptcy rumors and included the sale of the office
products manufacturing operations to Flextronics for $118 million.95 As with Lego, Xerox then
re-purchased the Flextronics output for resale.
As indicated by the Discussion Draft independent parties outsource production, and on
occasion receive compensation (Xerox). At other times an arm’s length exchange will include
no compensation (Lego Group).
(D) Indemnification of the restructured entity for the detriments suffered
as a consequence of the restructuring
Section (D) of the Discussion Draft considers whether or not an entity within a MNE
should be compensated at arm’s length for detriments suffered as a result of a business
restructuring. The analysis follows: (a) a standard assessment of the contract, (b) whether there
is (or should be) an indemnification clause, and (c) whether the indemnification clause is at
arm’s length. Although there is a suggestion that one of the factors considered should be
whether there is “a loss of profit potential,” nothing is done to expand on this concept.96
The Discussion Draft considers indemnification in fours subsections:
92

Discussion Draft, supra note 4, at ¶ 98.
Jeffrey T. Polzer & Alison Berkeley Wagonfeld, Flextronics: Decising on a Shop-Floor System for Producing the
Microsoft Xbox (HBS No. 9-403-090) (Aug. 23, 2004); Robert S. Huckman & Gary P. Pisano, Flextronics
International Inc. (HBS No. 9-604-063) (Apr. 13, 2010); David Hoyt & Charles Holloway, Flextronics: A Focus on
Design Leads to India, (Stanford Business School No. OIT-45) (Jan. 10, 2005)
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Parmy Olsen, Billionaire’s Lego Outsources to Flextronics, FORBES.COM (June 20, 2006)
http://www.forbes.com/2006/06/20/lego-group-restructuring-cx_po_0620autofacescan05_print.html
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Xerox, 2001 Annual Report 18 (restated January 27, 2003).
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Discussion Draft, supra note 4, at ¶ 99.
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(D.1) Whether the arrangement that is terminated, non-renewed or substantially
re-negotiated is formalized in writing and provides for an indemnification clause;
(D.2) Whether the terms of the agreement and the possible existence or nonexistence of an indemnification clause or other type of guarantee (as well as the
terms of such a clause where it exists) are arm’s length;
(D.3) Whether indemnification rights are provided for by commercial legislation
or case law;
(D.4) Whether at arm’s length another party would have been willing to
indemnify the one that suffers from the termination or re-organization of the
agreement.

There is no presumption that indemnification is due.97 If anything, Section (D) makes it
clear that intercompany agreements should be put in writing, and (if possible) they should have
termination clauses that are tested by the arm’s length and are flexible enough to allow for early
termination. Commentators acknowledge this emphasis.98
However, this does not mean that contracts without termination clauses will not be
respected. The UK case of Baird Textile Holdings Ltd. v. Marks & Spencer plc,99 concerns the
termination of a thirty-year commercial relationship without a termination clause in the supply
contract. Baird claimed “lost profits.” Compensation was denied.100
In a somewhat unsatisfying ending, Section (D) concludes with an elementary example.
Entity A decides to purchase manufactured product from a related party C, and in doing so
terminates a similar contract with related party B. The Discussion Draft simply runs through
possible compensation permutations:
 A would indemnify B;101
 C would indemnify B;102
 C would pay A;103
 C would meet A’s obligation to indemnify B;104
 A and C would share the costs of indemnifying B;105
 Neither A nor C would indemnify B, but P [the common parent] would indemnify B.106
This is a place where some analysis (rather than a list) would be helpful.
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Discussion Draft, supra note 4, at ¶ 99.
Deloris R. Wright & Harry A. Keates, Comments on the OECD Discussion Draft on Transfer Pricing Aspects of
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CONCLUSION
Although business restructurings may be abusive, the vast majority of them are not. In
addition, even though some business restructurings may involve (a) the conversion of a fullyfledged manufacturer to a contract manufacturer; (b) the conversion of a fully-fledged distributor
to a stripped distributor; (c) the development of shared service centers and contract service
providers, or (d) the transfer of intangible assets to off-shore holding companies, once again, the
vast majority of restructurings are not. A good restructuring is all about changing decisions, not
about shuffling assets.
Business restructurings are a very common. Nearly half of all CEOs resort to them
within the first or second year of their tenure. However, more than 70% of business restructuring
fail to achieve their stated goal of boosting financial results. Those that are the most successful
are decision-driven. The empirical evidence is clear. “[D]ecision effectiveness and financial
results correlate at a 95% confidence level or higher for every country, industry, and company …
What’s more, the research reveal[s] no strong statistical relationship between structure and
performance.107
Issue Note No. 2 of the Discussion Draft is deeply flawed. It relies on an unproved
correlation between structure and performance (profit/loss potential). The Discussion Draft
focuses on transfers of assets, and the profit/loss potential they “carry,” when it really needs to
come to grips with the unique, highly valuable intangible that a restructuring creates – the new
decision-matrix. A business restructuring is no more than an internally directed R&D effort that
goes into production. It should be treated that way.
This is not to say that there are not transfer pricing issues involved in the transfer of
assets among related parties. Nor is it to say that there is not a measure of potential profit/loss
that should be added to the raw market value of an asset transferred in a restructuring. It is to say
that the Discussion Draft is looking in the wrong place, if this is the only place it is looking. It
needs to look at decisions.
When transfer pricing problems arise in business restructurings, the current Transfer
Pricing Guidelines are reasonably adequate. This appears to be the observation of WP-6 when it
discusses the transfer of tangible assets, intangible assets, a going concern, and outsourcing in
Section (C) of Issue Note No. 2. The Norwegian government’s successful litigation in Cytec
provides reasonably good evidence that the current rules are very workable.108
Before we add another analytical structure to the Transfer Pricing Guidelines for all
business restructurings, not just a structure for tax abusive restructurings, we need to get the
Discussion Draft focused on what business is focused on – the decisions.
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Supra note 51
Decision of the Court of Appeals of Eidsivating (September 26, 2007), Cytec Norge GPAS and Cytec Overseas
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into a toll manufacturer where valuable intangibles were transferred to a foreign related party at less than an arm’s
length price). See also: Hanne Flood, Business Restructuring: The Question of the Transfer of Intangible Assets,
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